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COMMUNISM VERSUS ZIONISM:
THE COMINTERN, YISHUVISM, AND
THE PALESTINE COMMUNIST PARTY
JOHAN FRANZE´N
This article discusses how the official communist position on the
Zionist project in Palestine went from hostile condemnation in the
early 1920s to wary support after World War II. In so doing, it fo-
cuses on the ideological struggle between the traditional party line
and “Yishuvism,” a theory that sought to reconcile Zionist and com-
munist ideas, as it played out in the two bodies most closely involved
in shaping Comintern policy on Palestine (the Palestine Communist
Party and the Communist Party of Great Britain). In following the tor-
tured justifications for evolving positions, the author identifies the key
actors shaping the debate and turning points impacting it, especially
the 1936–39 Arab Revolt, Britain’s 1939 White Paper, and the wartime
fight against fascism. The author contends that an important reason
for the USSR’s post-war about-face on Palestine was the success of the
Yishuvist ideological campaign.
THE OFFICIAL COMMUNIST POSITION on the Zionist project in Palestine during the
British Mandate was one of unreserved hostility. Zionism was seen as a reac-
tionary and colonialist movement whose aim was to build, with the assistance
of British imperialism, a Jewish state “upon the backs of another people.”1 Fur-
thermore, Zionist ideas were considered especially dangerous for Soviet Jews
because they diverted attention from the task of “building socialism” in the
Soviet Union. However, when in 1924 the Palestine Communist Party (PCP)
was granted membership in the Communist International (Comintern), a cat-
alyst for change in this position was created. Instructed by the Comintern to
“Arabize” its membership, the PCP, the only internationalist party in Palestine
during the Mandate, became an arena of ideological struggle between com-
munist and Zionist ideas, with Zionist-leaning Jewish communists developing
theories that sought to combine the seemingly irreconcilable ideologies. These
theories were long confined mostly to Palestine and the occasional pro-Zionist
writer in the international communist press. As the crisis in Palestine intensi-
fied, however (especially after the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in 1936), the
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new ideas began to reverberate and became more systematic within the po-
litical writings of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). Based in the
metropolis from which Mandate Palestine was ruled, it is not surprising that
the CPGB came to have a preponderant influence on Palestine policy within
the Comintern.
This article discusses the process whereby the Comintern’s response to the
evolving theories justifying the Jewish colonization of Palestine changed from
denouncing them as “Zionist deviations” to embracing them as a core part
of the ideological discourse of the post–World War II debates on the future of
Palestine. An important part of the ideological basis for Soviet and international
communist support for a Zionist state in Palestine in the late 1940s in fact was
based on the ideas first formulated in the 1920s by Jewish communists in
Palestine and then developed over the decades.
THE COMINTERN AND THE PCP
The 1917 October Revolution and the subsequent establishment of the
Soviet Union created an enormous impetus for the international communist
movement (i.e., communism as interpreted by the Russian Bolsheviks). In 1919
the Third Communist International was founded in Moscow as a Soviet initia-
tive to assist and guide the world revolutionary movement. Its predecessor, the
Second International, had ceased to exist during World War I, as many of its
constituent member parties chose—contrary to their prewar stated intent—
to support their “own” imperialist countries in that war. Unlike the Second
International, the Third International was exclusively made up of communist
parties; in fact, assuming the name “Communist” was a requirement for mem-
bership. Thus, whereas the Second International had consisted of “socialist”
and “social democratic” parties, some of which were even ruling parties in
their countries, the Third International’s members were mostly clandestine
parties. Furthermore, in contrast to the Second International, many of whose
European member parties regarded the colonial world as politically “immature,”
incapable of grasping the tenets of socialism, and indeed likely to benefit from
colonial (though “socialist”) rule so as to raise the political level of the “natives,”
the Third International was characterized by its thoroughly anti-colonial and
anti-imperialist outlook. This was apparent in its political program, adopted at
its first congress on 4 March 1919, which vowed to “support the exploited
peoples of the colonies in their struggle against imperialism.”2
The establishment of the Comintern precipitated ideological struggles over
the nature of the “socialist revolution” and eventually splits in many of the
old socialist parties, with left wings breaking away to form new parties that
affiliated themselves with the Comintern. This was the case of the PCP, which
emerged from a split within the Labor Zionist Poale Zion movement. Already
in 1919 a left-wing in the Palestine section of that movement broke away to
form the Mifleget Poalim Sozialistit (Socialist Workers’ Party), which, while
still considering itself Zionist and attending the Poale Zion World Congress in
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1920, applied for Comintern membership. This was rejected because of the
party’s “nationalist nature,” its unwillingness to adopt the name “Communist
Party,” and its refusal to denounce Jewish immigration into Palestine. But af-
ter disintegrating into several factions under the pressures of persecution by
the British Mandate authorities, the two largest of the splinter groups merged
in 19233 and, after protracted negotiations with the Comintern leadership,
the new party was granted Comintern affiliation.4 In March 1924, the group
assumed the name “Palestine Communist Party,”5 and, after endorsing the Com-
intern charter, became its official representative in Palestine.
The requirement of subscribing to the charter’s detailed list of twenty-one
articles had been defended by Lenin as a way of keeping the new organization
free of undesirable elements, “intermediate parties and groups of the ‘Center’”
that sought to benefit from the Comintern’s “steadily gaining strength” while
hoping to “retain a degree of ‘autonomy’ that will enable them to pursue their
previous opportunist or ‘Centrist’ policies.” The danger, Lenin warned, was that
“In certain circumstances, the Communist International may be faced with
the danger of dilution by the influx of wavering and irresolute groups that
have not as yet broken with their Second International ideology.”6 Without a
doubt, the new PCP fell into this category. Article 8 of the charter, for example,
stated that “Any party wishing to join the Third International must ruthlessly
expose the colonial machinations of the imperialists of its ‘own’ country, must
support—in deed, not merely in word—every colonial liberation movement,
demand the expulsion of its compatriot imperialists from the colonies . . . ”.7
Furthermore, the Comintern’s “Theses on the Eastern Question,” drawn up
in December 1922 at its fourth congress, stated that “The pseudo-socialist
colonialist tendencies of some categories of well-paid European workers in the
colonies must be firmly and stubbornly opposed.” The text also denounced all
forms of European “communist” organization on ethnic lines in the colonies:
“The formation of separate Communist organizations of Europeans in some
colonies . . . is a hidden form of colonialism and furthers imperialist interests.
Any attempt to build Communist organizations on ethnic lines contradicts the
principle of proletarian internationalism.”8
In light of these positions, the Executive Committee of the Communist In-
ternational (ECCI) told the leadership of the new party that its future depended
on its “territorialization,” that is, on its “transformation into a mass Party of Arab
workers.”9 Haim Auerbach, the party’s representative in the negotiations with
the Comintern, had been told by Karl Radek, the head of the Comintern’s East-
ern Section, that the PCP needed to “get out of the Ghetto!”10 This meant, in the
words of Joseph Berger-Barzilai, the PCP’s first party secretary, that the party’s
political activity could no longer be “exhausted on work in the Zionist Ghetto”
and that in order to engage “in active immediate anti-imperialist struggle, it
has to enter into a living connection with the decisive mass of the working
population, the Arab workers and peasants.” To this end, he continued, “the
party, which to date has been exclusively composed of Jewish immigrants,”
had to transform itself into “a party of Arab workers and territorialized Jewish
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comrades,” i.e., those who had grown up in Palestinian conditions and were ac-
quainted with the Arabic language and Arab customs.11 This fundamental task
touched upon the very essence of the party: if it remained Jewish, objectively
it would be a colonialist party, whereas if it succeeded in “territorializing” its
Jewish membership and “Arabizing” its membership overall, its presence in the
country would be justified.
The Comintern’s position on the Zionist project in Palestine was clear-cut.
Its general view was that the Jews constituted a colonizing minority, led by
the Jewish bourgeoisie through the Zionist movement. In 1930, the ECCI, in
an open letter to the PCP, declared that Zionism was “the expression of the
exploiting and great power oppressive strivings of the Jewish bourgeoisie,
which makes use of the Jewish national minorities in Eastern Europe for the
purpose of imperialist policy to insure its domination.”12 The PCP grudgingly
accepted the Comintern line, and so the resolution of its seventh congress in
1930 unequivocally stated that Zionism was the “militant detachment of impe-
rialism” waging “a colonizing struggle of annihilation against the local toiling
masses.”13 All Zionist thought, whether right wing or left wing, was considered
reactionary because of its colonialist and imperialist nature. Official Communist
propaganda called upon Jewish workers in Europe to stay where they were:
“The true task of the Jews in every country is to fight against oppression in their
own country shoulder to shoulder with their Communist fellow workers.”14
However, within the European non-communist Left there was growing sup-
port during the 1930s for the Zionist “project,” encouraged by the efforts of
Labor Zionists (especially Poale Zion) to portray the essence of Zionism as
“building socialism” in Palestine. Britain, with a significant number of Jewish
leftist workers, was no exception to this trend, and Labor Zionist positions
began to be expressed on occasion by the CPGB.15 Meanwhile, in Palestine
the PCP leadership upheld the official Comintern line and declared that: “the
Zionist movement is not a Socialist movement—it is a reactionary movement,
wanting to build a capitalist system upon the backs of another people.”16
Such statements notwithstanding, the Zionist project in Palestine was not
taken very seriously by the Comintern, which tended to dismiss it as idealistic
and unfeasible, a na¨ıve dream nurtured by the Jewish bourgeoisie. In general the
Comintern was highly dismissive of Zionist ideology (especially its “socialist”
variety) and fundamentally underestimated its impact (which might explain
the Soviet policy of offering ardent Zionist political prisoners the choice of
“deportation” to Palestine, a practice that continued until 193417). It failed to
appreciate Zionist nationalism’s deep-seated appeal to the Jewish workers of
Eastern and Central Europe, who became the driving force of the colonization.
BER BOROKHOV, ARABIZATION, AND YISHUVISM
The ideological origins of the founding members of the PCP can be traced
to one of the early “socialist Zionist” theoreticians, Ber Borokhov (1881–1917).
He argued that before Jews could struggle for socialism or revolution they had
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to establish a “normal” national state with a “normal” social stratification, that
is, with a mass of Jewish peasants and proletarians.18 In contrast to “bourgeois
Zionism,” Borokhov’s “proletarian Zionism” advocated the Zionist project as a
movement in the interests of the “Jewish proletariat” rather than the Jewish
people as a whole.19 Although acknowledging that Jewish proletarians were
few, Borokhov nevertheless dealt with the concept of the Jewish proletariat
as an already existing social force, which enabled him to portray his theory as
socialist and to promote the Zionist project among the Jewish communities of
Eastern Europe.
Arrival in Palestine for some leftist Jews brought the realization that the
Zionist project was in fact colonialist rather than socialist. When seeing that
the land was not empty, as they had been told, but in fact was very much inhab-
ited and cultivated by Arabs deeply opposed to their “project,” many Jewish
communists and socialists left.20 For most of those who remained, however,
including the founders of the new party, Borokhov’s ideas constituted a core
tenet of their diverse Weltanschauungs. For them, “building socialism” was
the reason for their coming to Palestine; they did not see themselves, as the
Comintern contended, as “colonizing” a country against the will of its inhab-
itants. Consequently, the Comintern directive to “Arabize” the party and to
“territorialize” the membership by adopting local ways prompted an intense
ideological struggle. The supporters of the Comintern line were undoubtedly
in the minority, and the leadership clearly had its mind set on the Yishuv, albeit
without being vocal about it. There was, however, a small radical faction within
the minority current calling itself the Jewish Workers Committee, which went
so far as to maintain that the party should focus its work exclusively on the
Arab population since the Yishuv was homogenous and too intimately identi-
fied with the Zionist project to be penetrable.21 This faction inevitably clashed
with the leadership and was eventually expelled from the party in 1928.22
Within the pro-Yishuv party mainstream, a theory known as “Yishuvism”
developed in an attempt to reconcile official communist anti-Zionist princi-
ples with local conditions so as to justify the party’s continuing focus on the
The “Yishuvists” justified
Jewish colonization on the
grounds that the “Jewish
proletariat” in Palestine
would become a socialist
vanguard and raise the
political level of the Arab
fellahin.
Yishuv. Ideologically, this theory, rooted in Borokhov’s
ideas, maintained that the Yishuv was playing a progres-
sive social and economic role, as evidenced in the eco-
nomic transformation fueled by Jewish immigration.23
This transformation, it was argued, would break down
the feudal structures of the Palestinian countryside
and thus advance the development of class differen-
tiation within the Arab population.24 It was further
maintained that the dynamic of “private capitalist” de-
velopment in the Yishuv, being in conflict with the
“national colonization” of Zionism, would lead to a social and political
differentiation of the Jewish masses and their consequent radicalization.25
The “Yishuvists” thus justified Jewish colonization on the grounds that the
“Jewish proletariat” in Palestine would become a socialist vanguard and raise
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the political level of the Arab fellahin. What the theory failed to take into
account—aside from the fact that there was no real difference between the
communist “Yishuvist” and the Labor Zionist positions, which both justified
colonization by the “progress” brought to the “natives”—was the fact that the
Zionist workers were often more ideologically motivated to build “socialism”
in the “promised land” than the Jewish capitalists. Contrary to the Yishuvist ar-
gument, they had not been duped into coming to Palestine but had come out of
ideological conviction. Nonetheless, the notion of a Jewish proletariat in Pales-
tine being oppressed and exploited by the Zionist bourgeoisie was politically
useful: if they were just as oppressed as the Arabs, they could not constitute a
colonizing minority.
The development and persistence of Yishuvist ideas within the party was
hardly surprising in a community that lived and worked exclusively in the
Yishuv, spoke only Russian or Yiddish, or at best Hebrew, but certainly no
Arabic, and obviously had little in common with the Arab peasant masses.
Because of the hegemony of Yishuvist thought among the party’s rank-and-file,
the Comintern’s “nativization” directive did not have many advocates on the
ground, and for the most part it received only lip service.
Still, some work among the Arab population did begin in the 1920s. Given
the predominantly urban nature of the PCP, the “Arab work” was mostly car-
ried out among the urban Arab intelligentsia or the nascent Arab working class,
whereas the Arab population overwhelmingly was made up of peasants. The
success of the “Arabization” directive was, therefore, very limited, leading to
the recruitment of only a few dozen Arabs, for the most part more nationalist
than communist. Some of these young Arab radicals were sent to the Commu-
nist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV) in Moscow for training.26 As a
result, an Arab cadre loyal to the Comintern rather than to the Jewish leaders
was gradually built up. Because of the scarcity of Arab workers and the lack of
any real mass work among the Arab rural population, the few Arabs that could
be recruited were rapidly promoted to leadership positions, leaving some of the
Jewish rank-and-file members feeling maltreated. At the seventh PCP congress
in 1930, a Central Committee with an Arab majority was elected for the first
time,27 giving the impression that the advocates of Arabization had won. The
PCP’s representative at the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935—a certain
“Hadyar”28—thus declared that the “opportunist semi-Zionist leadership of the
C. P. of Palestine” had been removed.29 Nonetheless, the overwhelming major-
ity of party membership continued to be Jewish and nearly all work continued
to be directed toward the Yishuv,30 as can be seen from the fact that throughout
the 1930s most of the party materials continued to be printed in Hebrew.31
THE ARAB REVOLT, THE PCP, AND THE CPGB
In May 1936 the Arab Revolt against Jewish immigration and land sales broke
out in Palestine. Continuing on and off for three years, it was to have a major
impact on the future of the PCP and served as a catalyst for changes within the
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CPGB. It began spontaneously, though almost immediately Arab notables led
by the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husayni, formed the Arab Higher Com-
mittee (AHC) in an attempt to gain a hold over it. Despite using the full limit of
their traditional influence, they never quite managed to control the popular re-
volt in the urban areas, and in the countryside many of the guerrilla bands that
sprang up did not recognize the AHC’s leadership at all. The AHC was further
circumscribed by the fact that, although it initially tried to limit the revolt’s
scope and showed a conciliatory attitude toward the British, it was still held
responsible for the deteriorating situation. Despite the outlawing of the AHC
and the exile of all its leaders in 1937, the British were not able to crush the re-
volt until 1939, and then only through a joint military and diplomatic offensive
involving 20,000 British troops, the Royal Air Force, the Jewish supernumer-
ary police, and a Jewish counterinsurgency force known as the Special Night
Squads.32 With Britain’s publication of the May 1939 White Paper, which for
the first time put sharp limits on its “Jewish national home” policy, a wedge was
driven into the Arab national movement. The combination of general fatigue
and hopes that Britain would honor its promises dampened popular support
for the revolt, enabling Britain to finish it off. As for the guerrilla bands that
refused to lay down arms, they found themselves without logistical support
and had to resort to more unpopular methods (e.g., extortion and robbery) to
sustain themselves.
When the revolt broke out, the leadership of the PCP (which as noted above
had an Arab majority though the party as a whole had remained overwhelm-
ingly Jewish) supported it fully, arguing that it was a “necessary self-defence”
against two powerful enemies.33 At the same time, however, the party’s Yishu-
vist current, headed by Arieh Lev, secretary of its Tel Aviv committee, drafted
a leaflet in May 1936 condemning the revolt.34 This was immediately rejected
by the party’s Central Committee, which issued a counter leaflet in support
of the rebellion.35 The arrest of much of the party’s Arab leadership36 greatly
facilitated the task of the Yishuvists, who had been utilizing the tensions to
claim that the Jewish members were unable to work among the Arab masses
as long as the revolt continued. After the arrest in late 1936 of Ridwan al-Hilu
(Musa), the secretary of the PCP and an Arab, the remaining members of the
Central Committee gave in to the pressures and announced in early 1937 the
establishment of a Jewish Section. The Central Committee saw the section’s
task simply as a means to “transfer the decisions of the Central Committee to
the Jewish circles,”37 the concession being presented as a temporary measure
for the duration of the revolt. In fact, however, the separate section laid the
ground for the party’s future split along ethnic lines. Ideologically dominated
by Yishuvism, the section grew increasingly confident and began openly to
pursue pro-Zionist policies once it realized how weak the Central Commit-
tee had become. Among other things, it decided to pursue an alliance with
the “progressive forces” within the Yishuv.38 Using as pretext the resolutions
of the Seventh Comintern Congress of 1935, which had called for the cre-
ation of broad popular fronts to combat fascism, the PCP’s Jewish members
were encouraged to join Zionist organizations and parties, to gain positions
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of influence and hold office,39 and to “transfer the essence of Party activity”
to these legal organizations.40 The aim was to strengthen the PCP’s position
within the Yishuv. By demonstrating to Jews the party’s positive role within the
Yishuv,41 the section laid the foundations that would later be used to transform
the PCP into a mainstream Zionist party.
Initially the international communist press treated the Arab Revolt as a “pro-
gressive anti-imperialist revolt.” The Comintern set the tone by its positive
stance, and this was closely adhered to by the CPGB, whose Central Commit-
tee declared in June that the revolt and its demands were “fully justified and
should be supported.”42 Despite this confident assertion, however, the CPGB
at the time did not have much previous specialist knowledge of the Palestine
question (or indeed of any colonial question except India43), the over-arching
concern then being the rise of fascism in Britain and elsewhere in Europe.
Indeed, the outbreak of the Arab Revolt had caught the CPGB off guard.
With no clear policy on Palestine and with an increasing following among
British Jews, it realized the need for clear guidelines on this and other “Jewish”
questions. The fact that the party’s June statement supporting the revolt was
criticized by some Jewish members as representing an “anti-Semitic partner-
ship” with “Arab fascists”44 was itself an indication of that need. Ben Bradley,
the party’s colonial secretary,45 refuted that accusation even while conceding
that the revolt was the product of a “clash between the vital interests of two
groups of Fascist capitalists, the Zionist Jews and the feudal Arab aristocracy.”46
In any case, it was the Arab Revolt that prompted the decision to set up an
“Advisory Board” that would give guidance to the party leadership on Jewish
questions.47 However, because most communists, especially those of Jewish
origin, were reluctant to pursue “ethnic politics,” the party had difficulty finding
members to sit on the new body. As a result, the advisory group, which soon
took on a more permanent shape as the “Jewish Bureau,” had to be filled largely
by non-party members loosely attached to the party through various front
organizations.48
Although only sparsely represented in the top party leadership, Jewish com-
munists had a strong presence in the party cadre (i.e., in the mid-level leadership
and party administration). According to Jason Heppell, they constituted some
7 percent of that category, a relatively high proportion considering that Jews
formed less than 1 percent of the British population.49 Heppell has suggested
that there were two main identities among Jewish members of the CPGB:
“grass roots Communist Jews” and “Jewish activists.” The first group—the vast
majority—comprised young second or third generation Anglicized Jews whose
loyalty was first and foremost as communists. “Within the context of political
activity, they were not ‘Jewish’ variants of a Communist, but were rather Jews
separated from their ethnic community by their Communist beliefs.”50 The
“Jewish activists,” on the other hand, were a small group, scarcely more than a
dozen, consisting almost exclusively of older, first generation immigrants from
Eastern Europe, whose language was Yiddish and whose cultural background
was non-British.51 These “Jewish activists” were torn between communism and
their affinity for Jewish culture. Anxious to portray themselves as anti-Zionists,
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they took every opportunity to support expressions of “Jewishness” within the
framework of the Communist party. As pointed out by Henry Felix Srebrnik:
“Although classical Marxism was hostile to Jewish nationalism, the Jewish Com-
munists managed to square this with fervent support of ‘non-Zionist’ forms
of Jewish consciousness, remaining, if sometimes covertly, left-wing Diaspora
nationalists.”52 Perhaps not surprisingly, it was “Jewish activists” that made up
the CPGB’s new Jewish Bureau.
One of the Jewish Bureau’s most influential members was Israel (Issie)
Panner. Born in Austria in 1908, he became a naturalized British subject in
November 1933 and the next year became the Secretary of the ICCS (Jewish
Organization for Colonization in the Soviet Union).53 While the actual lead-
ers of the Jewish Bureau (and later Jewish bodies within the CPGB) were Lazar
Zaidman and Chimen Abramsky, it appears that Panner was responsible for writ-
ing on Palestine. Under the anagram I. Rennap (or sometimes I. Renap), he con-
tributed numerous articles on the Palestine question to the party journals Daily
Worker and Labour Monthly and to the Comintern journals International
Press Correspondence (Inprecorr) and its successor World News and Views.
The Comintern continued to support the Arab Revolt with relative consis-
tency until early 1939, when the fascist threat against the Soviet Union began
to overshadow other considerations. When the momentum of the revolt was
fading and the AHC leaders adopted more “terrorist” methods, the Comintern
denounced them as “traitors.” The new policy was declared in January 1939
in the Communist International, the central organ of the Comintern, which
wrote: “Eli Chusein [Haj Amin al-Husayni] and his mysterious men . . . are wreck-
ers and traitors to the true national movement of the Arabian people.”54 Within
the CPGB, this change of policy did not immediately take hold, primarily be-
cause of the impending London Round Table Conference bringing together
Arab and Zionist leaders in an attempt to reach agreement on what was to be
done in Palestine. During this period, the Jewish Bureau apparently felt con-
strained to uphold the legitimacy of the AHC (several of whose members—
though not the Mufti—had been permitted to attend) pending the outcome
of the conference. It was thus that in articles written in January and as late as
February, the very eve of the conference, Panner was still describing the AHC
as “genuine national revolutionary leaders,” enjoying the “backing of the Arab
people,” “the real leadership of the mass of the Arabs in Palestine,” and so on.55
Meanwhile, an all-out assault on the Mufti and the AHC was elsewhere un-
derway. Writing in World News and Views, the pseudonym M. Akin declared
that the Mufti “receives his orders direct from Berlin” and that the “partisan
divisions of the Mufti’s followers are led by German officers,” adding that it was
German propaganda that had caused the hostility between Jews and Arabs in
Palestine.56 With the London conference having ended in failure, Panner him-
self could now declare that the Mufti “was never to be trusted” and to describe
him and the AHC as “the most reactionary [elements] in Palestine.”57 With the
“the fascist offensive against the democracies” now being “the main enemy,”
he added that “the primary struggle of the colonial peoples must be against
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fascism and its agents in the colonial liberation movements, since the struggle
of the colonial peoples . . . can only be successful if the splitting and diverting
influence of fascist penetration is crushed.”58 Perhaps in an effort to justify the
volte-face, Panner wrote that whereas the Arab leaders had been “fulfilling a
progressive function” early in the revolt, “the struggle in Palestine to-day . . . has
ceased to be a struggle purely of the Arab masses against British Imperialism
and Zionist penetration.” This being the case, he argued (echoing the calls of
the PCP’s Jewish Section), “the Arab people, supported by the progressive ele-
ments within Palestine Jewry, must wage an uncompromising struggle against
the Grand Mufti and his associates.”59
On the part of the Jewish Bureau, there is little doubt that the escalation in
tone was motivated to a large extent by Britain’s unilateral publication, after the
London conference’s failure, of the White Paper, which the Yishuv went all out
to combat as the death knell of the Zionist project: the paper in essence rejected
the 1937 Peel Commission proposal to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab
states, limited Jewish immigration to 75,000 persons over the next five years,
restricted land sales to Jews, and called for the establishment of institutions that
could lead to independence of a unitary Palestinian state after ten years.60 Us-
ing the fight against fascism as a pretext, Panner strongly denounced the White
Paper, claiming that it would not end the revolt but would only “strengthen
the Mufti’s fascism and facilitate further fascist inroads into Palestine”61 and
would make “the Mufti and his clique . . . the tools of Britain and France.”62 That
Panner’s views were not those of the CPGB leadership can be glimpsed in a
sharp exchange he had with Ben Bradley, a member of the Central Commit-
tee and secretary of the party’s Colonial Information Bureau, the day after the
White Paper was issued. On 18 May 1939 Panner telephoned Bradley to dictate
his comments on the document for publication in the Daily Worker. Bradley,
however, completely modified the gist of Panner’s remarks when conveying
them to the Daily Worker, commenting that although “we should not throw
our arms around the White Paper,” the Arabs and Jews needed to work toward
“unity and a united representative Government.”63 When Panner, furious, con-
fronted Bradley about the change the following day, Bradley was vague as to
how it had come about, and in the exchange that followed Panner protested
heatedly that the article now read as if the party were upholding British im-
perialism and insisted that he was the one who was in charge of the party’s
policy on Palestine.64 After more heated discussion in a later conversation the
same day, Bradley told Panner to write a memorandum on the issue and that
he would mention it to Harry Pollitt, the party secretary.65 With no further
mention of the incident in the files, it seems reasonable to assume that Panner
decided not to pursue the matter.
TOWARD RECONCILING THE TRADITIONAL PARTY LINE AND YISHUVISM
The accusations by the CPGB’s Jewish Bureau that the AHC and the Arab
Revolt in general had fallen under fascist influence, while convenient for their
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purposes, were highly exaggerated. Although undoubtedly members of the
AHC (most notably Haj Amin al-Husayni himself) had come under fascist influ-
ence in the late 1930s, the spontaneous mass character of the revolt is beyond
doubt,66 and its thrust can hardly be described as fascist.67 In fact, the real
motivation for the Jewish Bureau’s all-out dismissal of the AHC as “agents of
Imperialism,”68 and its charges of the “fascist offensive” within the revolt, seems
more about arguing for a reevaluation of the party position on the Yishuv (or,
more bluntly, justifying the bureau’s increasingly open support of Yishuvism).
Using the vulnerable situation of European Jewry, the Jewish Bureau had gradu-
ally been able to press the case that the Jewish colony in Palestine constituted a
“national minority.” As early as 1936, it had managed to obtain from the CPGB’s
Central Committee an official statement describing the Jewish colony in Pales-
tine as a “national minority.”69 This trend accelerated with the discrediting of
the Arab national movement, and by 1939 Panner was describing Palestinian
Jewry as an “oppressed people” (a concept hitherto reserved for the Palestinian
Arabs) and praising the “heroic work of the Jewish settlers,” which according
to him needed to be “conserved and strengthened as a force for progress and
of benefit to the Arabs as well as the Jews.”70 Later that year, following the
policy of the Jewish Section in Palestine, Panner advocated the transformation
of the PCP into a mainstream Zionist party. He reported that the PCP (i.e., the
Jewish Section) had “called upon every responsible individual in the Yishuv to
defend unitedly the Histadrut.”71 And, so as to rid the last illusion of the PCP as
an anti-Zionist party, he exclaimed: “the Palestine Communists . . . have proven
themselves to be the best friends of the Yishuv. Their increasing influence is
reflected in the demand made by the hitherto anti-Communist, Zionist circles
for the legalisation of the C. P. of Palestine.”72
Soon, however, the Jewish activists within the CPGB were to suffer a set-
back: at the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, the Jewish Bureau
With the need to redirect
all efforts within
international communism
toward supporting the
Soviet war effort, there
was once again leeway for
cooperation with “suspect”
organizations on the
political left.
was suddenly dissolved. Although there is little archival
material pointing to the reason,73 the move was al-
most certainly linked to the Soviet-German nonaggres-
sion pact signed a few weeks earlier. But the fortune
of the Jewish activists changed again after Germany’s
attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. With the need to
redirect all efforts within the international communist
movement toward supporting the Soviet war effort (the
“Great Patriotic War”), there was once again increased
leeway for cooperation with previously “suspect” or-
ganizations on the political left. The Jewish Bureau
was reconstituted,74 and its prestige increased following
the 1943 visit of two prominent Soviet Jews to Britain to rally support for the
Soviet Union. Impressed by Soviet interest in the bureau, Rajani Palme Dutt,
one of the CPGB’s top leaders and its main theoretician on colonial questions,
elevated it to a subcommittee—now renamed the National Jewish Committee
(NJC)—responsible not to the London District Committee, as before, but to
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the Colonial and International Bureaus and to himself personally.75 With this
change, and in relocating the body to party headquarters, Dutt signaled the new
significance of Jewish issues by elevating them from the local to the national
level.
At its first meeting in April 1943, the NJC decided on the need for a “re-
evaluation of the whole question of Zionism and Palestine,”76 specifying in
December that the “reevaluation” was to be carried out “in the light of the
need for greatest unity in the fight against fascism.”77 Using the same lines of
argument as its forerunner, the NJC now came out fully in favor of the Yishuv,
espousing positions that were difficult to distinguish from mainstream Zionist
positions. In a 1944 “Statement on the Jewish Question,” the NJC declared that
the Yishuv was “playing a progressive role in the economic and social develop-
ment of Palestine and the Middle East” and that it took part “in a most positive
fashion” in the struggle against fascism, showing a “powerful expression” of
solidarity with the Soviet Union.78 In March 1945, the NJC argued that since
Palestinian Jewry was “the most progressive force in the Middle East,” Palestine
should be open to Jewish immigration on a mass scale and the White Paper
should be denounced “by all sections of Jewry as wrong policy.”79 Another
statement a month later announced that “Jews—everywhere—may aspire to
Palestine as a homeland,” because immigration was “a Jewish right,”80 and that
the time had come for the Jews to “restore many of the glories of which the
Jewish people are only aware from their Bible stories.”81 The minutes of an NJC
meeting in April state that Jewish Communists should be prepared “to unite”
with Zionists “in the interests of Jewry.”82
Meanwhile, in Palestine, the PCP’s Yishuvist trend had undergone changes of
fortune parallel to what had been witnessed with the CPGB’s “Jewish activists”:
in both cases, a setback suffered in the late 1930s had been followed a few
years later by a new phase of unprecedented influence. It will be recalled that
a separate Jewish Section of the PCP had been established in 1937 during the
Arab Revolt, and for the next few years this section and the Central Committee
had developed into two separate organizations pursuing opposing lines and
with no communication between them. When the revolt ended, efforts at
reconciliation between the two groups made clear that differences remained.
One of these involved the Jewish Section’s contention (like that of the CPGB’s
Jewish Bureau) that the Yishuv had developed into a “nation.”83 This notion was
rejected outright by the Central Committee, which, relying on Stalin’s classic
1912 definition of what constitutes a nation,84 declared in a document entitled
“Is There a Necessity for National Rights for the Yishuv?” that recognition of
the Yishuv’s national demands in Palestine amounted to support of Zionism.85
The Jewish Section also rejected the May 1939 White Paper, while the Central
Committee supported it.86 Continuing disagreement on these issues led the
Central Committee to dissolve the Jewish Section in December 1939. While
the majority of the section remained loyal to the Central Committee, a faction
within the section’s leadership, which came to be known as the Emet group,
left the party in early 1940.87 When contentious issues were put aside to aid
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the war effort, however, the Emet group in 1942 rejoined the party, even while
retaining its Yishuvist positions. The result was that the group’s Yishuvist ideas
began to spread and become generalized among the rest of the Jewish members
of the PCP.88
The party’s wartime truce with the Zionist movement and its pursuit of
an alliance with “progressive forces” in the Yishuv had several consequences.
While it led to an increase in the party’s Jewish membership, it also rendered
legitimacy to the Yishuvist line, causing alienation within the Arab section.89
Recognizing the problem, Party Secretary Hilu convened an “enlarged plenum”
in January 1943 and declared that the truce should be called off. This was met
with vociferous opposition, and as the plenum was unable to reach a decision
the case was referred to the Central Committee. Though the Central Committee
implemented Hilu’s suggestions,90 the dissolution of the Comintern later that
year undermined Hilu’s authority, touching off a struggle among rival groups
for the party leadership. The result was another ethnic split, with two groups
on the Arab side and three on the Jewish. Hilu, attacked from all sides, re-
alized that attempts at reunification were futile and retired from politics that
November.91 Most of the Arab communists united under the leadership of Emile
Tuma to form ‘Usbat al-Taharrur al-Watani 92 in early 1944, which chose to
work within the framework of the Arab national movement. On the Jewish
side, the smallest of the groups eventually developed into an overtly Zionist
party without real significance, while the other two united under Shmuel Miku-
nis. This group, which claimed to be the legitimate continuation of the party,
held a congress in May 1944 and was granted legal status, enabling it to pub-
lish its newspaper Kol Ha’am openly.93 Israel Panner, the CPGB’s authority
on Palestine, became the paper’s correspondent in Britain, writing under the
pseudonym Harry Robertson.94
Both the Mikunis and Tuma groups were eager to represent the correct com-
munist line in Palestine, but neither appears to have had direct contact with
the Soviets apart from the meetings both held with Sultanov, the Soviet Coun-
selor in Egypt, during the latter’s visit to Palestine in May 1944. It appears that
the only stable channel of communication between the Palestinian communist
groups and the Soviet Union was the CPGB.95 There were also claims that the
British communists played an important role in formulating communist policy
on Palestine. According to Chimen Abramsky, secretary of the NJC as of January
1946, the committee had become “involved in international negotiations” and
“formulated a lot of CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] . . . policy on
Palestine, as [the Soviets] themselves didn’t know too much about it.”96 Lazar
Zaidman, another NJC leader, stated that the NJC’s influence was so great that
its policy statements on Palestine became the basis of communist action pro-
grams, adding that it “should be realized that London is the place where all of
the various interests and views with regard to Palestine (and the Middle East)
meet and are decided upon.”97
Whereas such statements may be exaggerated, there is little doubt that the
CPGB was playing an active role in influencing the PCP. One example is the
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follow-up to the International Workers’ Congress held in London in 1945, where
a pro-Zionist resolution supporting the creation of a Jewish “national home” in
Palestine was backed by the Soviet Union.98 Mikunis’s PCP had been uncertain
about the Soviet position on the issue, and therefore what his own position
should be. After the congress the CPGB contacted Mikunis and, on the basis of
the Soviets’ support for the resolution, which it interpreted as recognition of
the legitimacy of the national home policy, instructed him to change his group’s
official anti-Zionist positions to pro-Zionist ones.99 In 1946, when Jewish groups
were carrying out armed attacks against the British, the Mikunis group, echoing
the CPGB’s “Jewish activists,” for the first time came out openly in support of
the Zionist leadership, claiming that the attacks constituted an “anti-colonial”
struggle and that the Yishuv was an “oppressed national group in a colonial
country.”100
ABOUT-FACE
Meanwhile, the Central Committee of the CPGB had continued to support
a unitary “democratic bi-national state” in Palestine and to oppose partition;
its eighteenth congress in 1945 declared that “a just and democratic settle-
ment of the problem of Palestine can only be achieved by the abolition of the
Mandate and the recognition of the national independence of Palestine un-
der a democratic regime which assures freedom and equal rights to Arabs and
Jews.”101 Needless to say, with the Jews constituting no more than 30 percent
of the Palestinian population, a democratic regime was as much anathema to
the Zionists as the White Paper had been, and the proposal was combated
tooth and nail. While the NJC very likely shared this view, it could not openly
come out against democratic principles. Instead, it argued that the anti-British
sentiment in the Yishuv was proof that “in the Jewish community . . . there is
a sharpening conflict between the leading Zionists, who are increasingly iden-
tified with the Jewish bourgeoisie and are willing tools of British imperialism,
and the rest of the Jewish community.”102 This argument, of course, was a logi-
cal development of the old Yishuvist notion of a chasm between an oppressing
Zionist bourgeoisie and the oppressed mass of Jewish proletarians. The notion
that the Yishuv played an anti-imperialist role because it had conflicting inter-
ests with Britain was an important justification for the developing communist
support for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, since ending British rule
in the country would constitute, it was argued, a major strategic blow to British
imperialism. Seemingly a new idea, its tenets went back to the first adherents
of Yishuvism.
In Palestine, whatever the private thoughts of the party leadership may have
been, Mikunis, too, realized that it was not possible to oppose a democratic
solution to the Palestine problem. At its tenth congress in November 1946, the
PCP had therefore condemned partition and called for a “united Arab Jewish
state . . . democratic and independent [with] full equality of rights.” Writing
in the Jewish Clarion (edited by Panner) in December 1946, Mikunis argued
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that the Palestine question should be decided in the UN’s Security Council.103
With the Soviet Union already having implied support for a Jewish “national
home,” the hope clearly was that Moscow would support partition.
Such hopes proved correct, and in November 1947 the Soviet Union sup-
ported the UN recommendation for the partition of Palestine into separate
Jewish and Arab states.104 While the leadership circles of the CPGB apparently
were somewhat taken aback, Panner in a letter to Dr. Biletski, the editor of
Kol Ha’am, wrote that he had not been surprised and that he had “not been
happy for a long time at the way the Palestine issue has been presented by
us.”105 Although Panner had been the leading CPGB authority on Palestine, in
the sense that he most closely followed events there, it is clear that when major
political statements were to be formulated, decisions were taken at a higher
level (as evidenced in the altercation between him and Bradley over the White
Paper in 1939). Despite an apparent loss in influence within the CPGB following
the Soviet decision, Panner appears to have continued to be heavily involved
in contacts between Mikunis’s PCP and the CPGB,106 and there is a striking
similarity between Panner’s earlier writing and the Mikunis group’s positions.
In Palestine, it was now the turn of the Mikunis group to change positions,
committing itself to the struggle “for the establishment of two independent
democratic states”107 in accordance with the new Soviet line. For the Arab
communists, on the other hand, the Soviet volte-face was much more difficult
to deal with. While blaming the traditional Arab leaders for playing into Zionist
hands by pursuing “racialist” policies, they denounced partition as an “impe-
rialist plot.” Explaining their independent stance, they declared that “notwith-
standing our friendship for the USSR, we do not tie ourselves to its policy, but
formulate our own from existing local conditions and the aims of our people.”
With time, however, they, too, came to defend the Soviet decision, which they
said was based on the Soviets’ desire to expel Britain from the area.108
In the end, therefore, even the Arab communists, who since obtaining posi-
tions of influence within the PCP in the early 1930s had consistently combated
Zionism both generally and within the party, now had to bow to the over-
whelming force not only of the Zionist movement backed by the American
and British governments, but also to the authority of their erstwhile principal
sponsor, the Soviet Union. The historical irony is that the Soviet decision seems
at least partly to have derived from Yishuvist notions whose intellectual roots
went back to the 1920s. In those days, such ideas had been firmly opposed by
the international communist movement, but gradually, through the well-known
Zionist practice of creating “facts on the ground” and through the tireless dis-
semination of these ideas in Palestine and Britain, these ideas slowly gained
acceptance.
Without doubt, the horrendous crimes perpetrated by the Nazis against the
Jews during World War II also contributed to heightened sympathy for the
Zionist movement, encouraged by the Yishuvists in Palestine and the “Jewish
activists” in Britain who worked indefatigably to establish a connection be-
tween the oppressed Jews of Europe and the Jewish “national minority” in
COMMUNISM VERSUS ZIONISM 21
Palestine. Furthermore, World War II in itself created the need for the inter-
national communist movement to cast aside fundamental principles in order
to unite as broad as possible popular support for the defense of the Soviet
Union. In these circumstances, even previously rejected policies of agitation
along ethnic lines became acceptable. Organizations and groups within the
international communist movement that previously had been viewed with sus-
picion became the allies of the day, and pro-Zionist opinions were given leeway.
This opportunity was utilized by the Yishuvists in Palestine and the “Jewish ac-
tivists” in Britain to gradually transform the view of the Zionist colonization in
Palestine. In my opinion, Soviet reappraisal of Zionism can therefore, to a large
extent, be attributed to the success of the Yishuvists’ ideological campaign.
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